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SUMMARY 8 CONCLUSIONS 
Fault tree malysis is now commonly used to ;issess the 
adequacy, in reliability terms, of inclustri:tl systems. For 
complex systems ;in m;ilysis may produce thousands of 
combinations of events which c;in c;iuse system failure 
(minimal cut sets). The deterinination of these minimal cut 
sets c m  be a very time consuming ,process even on inodeni 
high speed digital computers. Also it the fault tree h:is inmy 
minimal cut sets calculating the exact top event prob:ibility 
will require extensive calcul;ilions. For many complex fault 
trees this requirement is beyond the capability of Lhe iivailaible 
machines, thus appro xi in a t  i on t ec hi1 i y u es nee cl to be 
introduced resulting in loss of accuracy. 
This paper describes the use of ;I Binary hcis ion 1)i:igr:un for 
Fault Tree Analysis m c l  soine ways ill  which i t  c;m be 
efficiently iinpleiiiented on :L cornputer. The work to date 
shows :i substmtial improvement in computation;il effort for 
large, complex fault trees an;ilysetl with this method in 
comp:rison to the tr:iditionad approach. The Binxy Decision 
Diagram method has the additional ndvantage that 
;ipproximalions are not required. exact cdcu1;itions lor the top 
event pw:uneters C;LII be perfonned. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fault tree diagram itself is an excellcilt way of deriving the 
failure logic for ;i system auld representing it in ;I form which is 
ideal for communic~itioIi  to other managers/ 
clesigners/operiitors etc. The f;iult tree is discussed in  cletail iii 
Andrews and Moss (Ref. 1). Since the method was first 
conceived in the early sixties, algorithms to dcrive the minimal 
cut sets have worked directly with the fault tree diagram itself 
using either bottom-up, Seinanderes (Ref. 2). or top-down, 
Fussell and Vesely (Ref. 3 ) ,  appro:ichcs. C'ompulerised 
methods to conduct this :ui;tlysis w e  iiow so well clevelopecl 
that further refinement is unlikely to resul~ in v x t  rcductions 
in computer time. Tackling this problem to  impi-ove 
computational efficiency has heell the miiiii conceni over the 
yews for many fault tree rese:uchers, Bennetts (Ref. 4) and 
Bengiamiii et al. (Ref. 5 )  hnve both aclclre 
I~Jsu a1 1 y by modify i 11 g t h e est ab 1 i sh ecl , con ve 11 ti on a 1 
approaiclies such :is MOCT JS (Ref. 3). 
It is felt that substmtial improvement in computer utilisation 
will only result from ;I completely new :ippro:ich. Such :in 
approach would involve spccifyiilg the logic cyu:ilion in ;I 
form which is easier to 1nanipu1;ite th;tn ;I tau11 wee. A recent 
p:tper by Riuzy (Ret. 6) tias iiiclicatecl that ;in nllcm;itive 
approach 
h t e r  :md 
P( Top) 
Ci 
using a Binary Decision Diagram may provide a 
more efticient means of aindysing tault trees. 
2. NOTATION 
- Probability ot Top Even1 o f  ;i hult tree. 
- Minirnal ('ut Set. 
PRE (Top) - R:re Event Approximation of Top Event 
Prohability. 
P ~ c , s u ~ ( T o p )  - Minirnal Cut Set Upper Bound of Top 
Event Probability. 
Xi - Boolean Variable. 
f(x)/fl/f2 - Boolean Functions. 
ire 
Ikcision 1)Bcgcun. 
<0p> 
Fi 
Q,sy  
W(0, t) 
~"sy.v 
Gi (Y) 
- If-Then-Else structure for Binary 
- Boolem operation ( . 01- +). 
- Nocles/Vertices in II Binary 1)ecision 
- Probability of occurrence of  top event of 
-Expected number of top event 
- System T Tnconclitional Failure Intensity. 
- (Iriticality Function for component i 
I>ingr:un. 
frlult tree. 
()cc U rrences . 
3.  ARRREVIATION,S 
s.0.p - s u m  of products expression 
BDI) - Binary 1)ecisioii 1)i:igram. 
4. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
The analysis of the fault tree is generally unclert:ken in two 
stages: qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. 
Qualitative nnalysis involves obtaining the various 
combinations of events which c;iuse system ftiilure (minimal 
cut sets) and yu;uitificatioii then cleats with calculating the 
probability or freyuency that system failure will occur. 
The conventional :ipproach to obtain the minimal cut sets is to 
take the Boolean logic expression for the Top Event and 
transform it into ;i sum of products (s.0.p) form. (.)ne way of 
doing this is to use ;I Bottom-'I Jp procedure such ;is that of 
Sem:inderes (Ref. 2). To obtain the w . p  form for the Top 
Event of the f:tult tree, the inputs to the lowest gates ; re  
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represented ais logic equations. Once the lowcr gates have %e11 
expressed in this way highei- gates :U-e then treated sirnil:u-ly. 
The final s.0.p fonn should be in term of basic events only. 
If the fault tree contains repeated events then the resulting 
s.0.p will not be m i n i n ~ l  and tlie minimal cut sets c;ui not be 
directly obtained. If this is the case Boo1e;iu Recluction R I ~ ! ~  
must first be applied to the s.0.p form to obtain the minirnal 
cut sets. The task of obtaining the minimal cut sets of ;i ftiult 
tree can become computationally intensive. if the logic 
equations produce many cut sets, due to the number of 
compzu-isons that 2u.e needed to make the expression minirnal. 
Also the expansion procedure c;ui rnake extensive dernands on 
memory space. 
To overcome these problems various techniques h w e  been 
employed to  reduce the uurnber of compnrisons (Ref. 7). Some 
methods only produce the most important minirnal cut sets. 
(hie of these techniques is refeired to  ;is culling, which means 
that cut sets of a certain order, s:iy 4 and above, ; re ignored or 
deleted from the expression, Rasmuson and Marshall (Ref. X) 
employ this technique in their paper. The .i ustificntion for 
doing this is that cut sets of ;I high order tend t o  have ;I low 
probability of occurrence ancl therefore do not 1nake ;I 
significmt contribution to the Top Event prolxibility. However 
the dis;idvantage of this is that when coininon cause failures 
:re involved this method results in consider;ible inaccuracies. 
Probabilistic culling GLII also be applied, in this c x e  ;i cut set 
whose probability of occuirence is below some thresholcl limit 
will ag:un be ignored. 
4.2 Qurr  n tit( i tivc An ( I  1y.v is 
The convenlional ;ipproach (see Henley and Kurn:unoto in 
Ref. 9) to  obtain the exact probability o f  the 'Top Evcnt is to 
use the formula: 
Where ci, i=l, .....,.... uc we the minini~il cut sets of the Top 
Event, i.e. product term. 
Clearly if the fiiult bee has many minirnal cut sets calculating 
P(Top) will require extensive calcu1:itions to evaluate each 
term in the expression, for rnaiiy complex fault trees the 
requirement is beyond the capability of the available 
machines. To simplify the calculation the Rare Eveut 
Approximation, P R ~  I TO^), c m  he used which is: 
111' 
(2) 
i=l 
However a more ;iccut';ite approxi~nation is the Mininixl (:ut 
Set T Jpper Bound, P M ~ - , ~ ~ ~ ( T O ~ ) ,  which is: 
5.  BINARY IIECISION DIAGRAM MElHOII  
The Binary Decision Diognun (BL>I>) method, developed by 
Rauzy (Ref. (71, first convei-ts the fault tree to ;I binary decision 
diagram which encodes ;in If-Then-Else (ire) structure. The 
attractive thing :&out the BIN> method is that the ite structure 
derives from Shannons' formula (Ref. lo), such that  if f(x) is 
the Boolean Function for the top event of a lault tree theu the 
Shannon formula c m  he written its: 
XI. ,f'l + XI. f 2  (4) 
and the corresponding ite structure is ite(X1, f l ,  f2), for ;I 
detailed account of this procedure refer to Ref. 11 and Ref. 12. 
From this diagram both the qualitative x i c l  quantitative 
analysis can be achievecl. 
The size of the resultkg BDD is cleterminecl by the ordering 
that has to be given to the basic events in the fault tree before 
the BDD is constructecl. This ordering has further implications 
for the analysis. If the BDD is not in ;I minimal fonn, then the 
BDD must first undergo ;I rniniinising algorithm before the 
minimal cut sets c:ui he obtained, this minimising technique is 
discussed in section 6. The quantitative analysis must be 
performed 011 the unminirnised diagram. The reason being that 
the minimising procedure produces ;i new BDD which only 
encodes the minimal cut sets. However if the ordering of the 
basic events produces ;I minimal BDI> then both the 
yunntitutive and qualitative analysis is straight forw:ud. It is 
therefore beneficial t o  achieve x i  ordering which is optimal in 
terms of the resulting size of the BI>I>. The ordering of basic 
events to produce ;i minimal diagram is consiclered in (Ref. 11) 
:ind discussed in section 7. 
To illustrate the method of obtaining the miniinad cut sets and 
probability of occuirence o f  tlie top event using the BI)I) 
method refer to the example fault tree 111 tiguic 1. 
Q 
G 1 9 
Figure 1. Example Fault Tree. 
Assume xi ordering for the basic events which is derived by 
considering those events at higher levels in the tree structure 
first: 
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XI<X2<X3<X4 F1 
To obtain the ire structures for each gate in the f:iult tree the 
following procedures are usccl: 
(1) Taking X<Y; 
Let J=ite(X, F1, F2) and II=ice(Y, (;I, (i2) then: 
J<op>Ii=ite(X, Fl<op>lI, 1:2<op>I I) ( 5 )  
(2) Taking X=Y: 
i.e., J=ite(X, F1, F2) :md II=ite(X, (;I, (;2) then: 
J<op>H=ite(X, Fl<op>(il, F2<op>(;2) (6) 
where <op> corresponds to the Boolexi operation ot the logic 
gates in the fault tree. For :ui AND gate <op> will he the dot 
or product symbol aiid tor ;in OR gate <op> will hc the 
addition symbol. 
Also it is eviclent that; 
Figure 2. BDD for ite(X1. ite(X2. itebX3. 1, ite(X4. 1. O)), 
ite(X3. 1. 0)). tb 
To oht:un the cut sets ~t the hult  tree the pnths through the 
BDD :re traced f rom the top or root vertex to ;I terminal 1 
vertex. Only the basic e v e m  that lie oil ;I  1 hriuich (indicating 
the friilure of that basic event) on the way to ;I terminal 1 
vertex are included in ;I path. Thereforr the p:iths through the 
BDD which correspond to the cut set\ o f  tlie lault tree :re: Therefore the BDT) calculations for the fault tree in iigure 1 are tlie following: 
G2 = ite(X3, 1,O)+itc(X4, 1, 0)  
= ite(X3, 1, ite(X4, 1,O)) 
Ci1 = ite(X2, l,O)+ite(X3, 1, 0)  
( 1 )  Xl.X2.X3 
(2) Xl.X2.X4 
(3 )  XI.X3 
= ite(X2, 1, ite(X3, I ,  0 ) )  
= ite(X2, I ,  ite(X3, I ,  O)).ite(X3, 1, ite(X4, 1,O)). 
= ite(X2, itc(X3, 1,  ite(X4, 1 ,  O)) ,  ite(X3, 1, 0). 
Cllearly the resulting BDI) for this orclering is not minimum ;is 
it procluces one reclundant cut set. The minimising procedure 
for the BDI) which will produce the miiiimal Cut  sets directly 
is discussed in section 6. 
Top = Gl.G2.XI 
ile(X1, 1,  0) 
ite(X3, 1, ite(X4, 1,  O)).ite(Xl, 1,  0 )  
= ite(X2, ite(X3, 1, itc(X4. 1,O)). ite(X3, 1, 0)) 
To obtxin the prohahility o f  occurrence oi the top evellt ot the 
fault tree ( e,,,,,, 1 the prohahihty ot (lie m n  of  the clisloiiit 
.ite(Xl, 1, 0) 
Top =ite(X1, ite(X2, ite(X3, 1, itc(X4. 1, O ) ) ,  ite(X3, 1, O ) ) ,  0 )  
This top event ire swucture coi-respontls to the B1)I:) shown in 
figure 2. 
paths through the BDL) iu-e culcul:wd. The clis,joint paths 
through the BDD are iouncl hy simply iriclucling in a path the 
basic events thar lie oil  ;I 0 branch m c l  inclicathig ~hese ;is xi, 
i.e., 'Not' Xi, meiuiing basic event i cloes 1101 occur. 1)isjoiiit 
paths through the BIN) ire: 
_. 
( 1 )  Xl.X2.X3 
(2) Xl.X2.X1.X4 
( 3 )  Xl.X2.X3 
Before continuing with the calculation of Q,vy,s the basic 
emits iu the f d t  tree ireecl to he assigned prohahilities, which 
for this example :re given in table 1.  
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Talde 1. Basic Event Data. 
Where; 
qi - I Jnavailability of compoiienr i. 
hi - Conditional failure intensity of coinpoileiit i. 
wi - 1 Jiicoiiditioiial failure intensity of component i. 
Since e,(?,, c m  be obtained from the probability of the sum of 
the dis.ioint paths through the BIII) then: 
Q,,,,s = P( x1. x2 .  x3 + x1. x 2 . m .  x 4  + X 1 . E .  X3) 
- 
- Yxl-qx2.Yx3 +Yxl-Yx2.(1-Yx?)-'1x4 + 
= 0.0 1(0.02)(( ). 03) + 0.0 I(( ). ( )2)( 1 - ( ). (13) 
Yxl-(l-Yx2)-'Ix3 
(0.04) + O.Ol(1- 0.02)(0.03) 
Q,v,s = 3.0776E - 4 
The algorithm used by R X ~ J  for calculating the probability is 
given in Ref. 6. 
For some systems it is Uie unreliability which IS required tor 
the top event i.e., the probability it will not work continuously 
over ;I given time period. An upper bound lor this is the 
Expected number of top event tccurrences W(0, t): 
t 
W(0 ,  t )  = J W,s,,,dt 
0 
w , ~ , ~ , ~  is the system unconditional f;iilure iiiteiisi(y: 
e(l;, q )  - is die probability of system f%ilure with qi = 1. 
e (o i ,y )  - is the probability of system failure with yi = 0 .  
Evaluating each o f  the two terms Q(l, , y) m c l  Q(0, , y) to1 
each cornponent coulcl be :ichievecl by tn \ t  \ub\titutiiig q, = 1 
aiid then yi = 0, i.e., the probability that coinpoiieiii i ecluals 1 
and 0 respectively, and re-running tlie system failure 
probability calculations. This would require the equivalent of 
211 evalu:ttions of the top event probability to cleduce all terms 
required in the expression for I .v,~, , ,~ in eq (X), 
Coiisicler the vat-iable Xi which occurs at  two nodes in tlie 
BDD (Figure 3 )  then: 
/ A \  / \  
/ \ 
/ \ 
/ 
Node ;I @ @ Node b 
1,' \o  l/ 
/ \ / \. 
/ \ 
/ 
\ / \\ 
/ \ 
/ 
Fipure 3. Considerinlr varialde Xi. 
where: 
(7) 
where Gi (y)  is tile criticality tunction lor e:tc~i componeri( 
The criticality function Gi ((1) is defined a s  the prob;ibility 
that the system is in it critical state with respect to componeiit i 
and that the failure of coinpoileiit i will then cause the system 
to go from the working t o  the f;ulecl state, i.e., the probability 
that the system fails only if component i liiils. Therefore: 
Where; 
1 1 7 - ~ ~ ( q )  - is tlie probability of the path section from tlie 1-oot 
1 
p , . i  (q )  - is the probability of the path section from 
node to node xi. 
node xi to the terminal 1 nocle after the 1 branch 
from node xi. 
0 
poV, (y) - is Uie probability of the path sectioii from nocle xi 
to the termin:il I node after the 0 branch from 
node xi. 
- is the probability of paths from the root node to 
the terminal 1 nodes which clo not go through ;i 
node for variable xi. 
Z(q) 
I1 - All Iiocles for variable xi on the BDD. 
Therefore: 
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A more etficient way to calculate w,,, is to rnake one pass ot 
the BDD to calculate p ~ . , ~  ((I), J X ) , , ~  ((I) :111il l ~ ) , ~  ((1) tor 
each node. With this irifoirnntion each G, (q )  C;III hc easily 
I 0 
eva1u;ltecl from eq (12) md w,y, !onnecl 
Node 
L,al,el 
F1 
F2 
F3 
F4 
FS 1 0 The algorithm Prohpost to c;dcul:ite p, ,  (q) ;uid I X I , ~  (y) is 
given in ligure 4. The calculation of IN.,,, ((I) c;ui he achieved 
by the algorithm Probprev given in figure 5. The cntic:tlity 
function G, ((I) for caicli hasic event is cadcuIated as sIiown in 
figure 6. 
Variable 1 Iwanch 0 Iwanch 
pointer pointer 
XI F2 0 
x 2  F3 F4 
X3 1 1 3  
X3 1 0 
x 4  1 0 
Figure 5. l’rol~~wev Algorithm. 
Figure 6. Algorithm for C;ilculatine the Criticality 
Function, G,,-. 
Ex;unde 
Applying thew :IlgoriUiins t o  the ex;irnple BDD given in tigurc 
2 illustrates the application ot this methocl. 
The ite table for the B1)D in figure 2 is: 
1 Performing one pass of the BL)D to evaluate po,vi ((1) and 
p O X i  ((1) for each node using Prohpost givcs: 0 
Probpost(FS) 
FS=ite(X4, 1,O) 
RtProht;ihle(X4, 1, 0 )  
Ql cp(X4)=0.04 
Q2=0 
Prohpos t(F4) 
F4=ite(X3, 1,O) 
RtProhtahle(X3. 1. 0) 
Q 1 +p(X3)=0.03 
Q2=0 
Probpost(F3) 
F3=ite(X3, 1, FS) 
RtProhtahle(X3. I ,  proh(€?i))t(X?. I .  0 04) 
Q 2 t (  l-p(X3))(0.04)=0.03~~ 
F2=ite(X2, F3, F4) 
RcPi-obt~thlt.(X2,pr~b(F3), proh(F4))t(X2,O.OhXX. 0.03) 
Qltp(x2)(o.o6xx)= 1.376E-3 
Ql tp(X3)=0.03 
Prohpos t (F2) 
Q 2 t (  1-1)(X2))(0.03)=O.O2‘~4 
Prohpost(F1) 
Fl=ite(Xl, F2, 0) 
IitProhtable(X1, proh(F2), O)t(X 1, 0.030776, 0) 
~ l t ~ ( X 1 ) ( 0 . 0 . ? 0 7 7 6 ) ~ 3 . 0 7 7 6 ~ - 4  
y2=0 
In performing this one pass. the top event prohahility caii he 
cadcu1;itecl by: 
for the top event node 
The value\ of Piohpo4t 1 h i a “  and Piohpost 0 h m c h  tor 
each node are eiiteicd into the nocle piohahility tahle, 
PROBTABLE ( w e  figuie 7) 
Next calculating the piohahility of the BD1) path to  
tach 11ode 14 established using Piohpiev and cnteied into the 
4111 column ot the PR( )BTABLE 
Prohprev: 
l’rohprev(Fl)= 1 
Fl=ire(Xl, F2, 0) 
Prohprev(F2)=P(X 1 ).l’robprev(k 1 1 
H2=0 
Prohprev(F3 )=p(X2). Pi.0 hprev( F2) 
=O.Ol( 1 )=O.Ol 
F2=ite(X2, F.?, F4) 
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=0.02(0.01)=2.0E-4 
Prohp1~v(F4)=( 1 -p(X2)).P1.0bprev(F2) 
=( 1 -0.02)(0.0 1 )=O .XE-3 
F3=ite(X3, 1, FS) 
Hl= l  
Pl-ohprev(FS)=( 1 -p(X3)).Prohprev(F3) 
=( 1-O.O3)(2.OE-4)= 1.04E-4 
F4=ite(X3, 1,O) 
Hl=l  
H2=0 
FS=ite(X4, 1,O) 
Hl= l  
H2=0 
Node I Variable post ‘1’ post ‘0’ prohprev 
Label I PR( )BTABLE 
F1 I X1 0.030776 0 1 
O.06XX 0.03 0.01 
0.04 2.OE-4 
0.XE-3 
1.0454 
Proht;ible(i, l)=Basic event ot node Fi 
Prohtable(i, 2)=Prohability of post ‘1’ brauich 
Probtable(i, 3)=Prohahility of post ‘0’ hr:uich 
Probtaible(i,4)=Prob~ihility ot previous 
Calculation of tlie criticality function is then straight forw:rd 
using the algorithm providcd in figure 6. 
Criticality Algorithm: 
c;(x1)=ci(x2)=(:~(x3)=~;(x4~=0 
Fl=Probtable(Xl, 0.030776, 0, 1) 
(~(x1)=0+1(0.030776-0) 
=0.030776 
F2=Probtable(X2, 0.06XX. 0.03, 0.0 1) 
(;(x2)=0+0.0 1 (0.06xx-0.03) 
=3.XXE-4 
F3=Prt)bt&le(X3, 1, 0.04, 2.OE-4) 
(;(X3)=0+2.0E-4(1-0.04) 
=1.02E-4 
F4=Probtahle(X3, 1, 0. 0.XE-3) 
G(X3)=1.02E-4+0.XE-3( 1-0) 
=O . 00 2E - 3 
FS=Probt&le(X4, 1, 0, 1.04E-4) 
C;(X4)=1.94E-4( 1-0) 
=1.04E-4 
Since we have calculated the criticality function for each 
component, w , ~ ~ ~ ~  c m  now he evaluaietl using the trequency 
data from table 1 using eq (X). 
1 Jsing eq (7) the expected nuinher of top event O C C U I T ~ I ~ C ~ ~  hi 
tiuie, t, c;ui he obtauned. 
6. MINIMISING THE RDl)  
In the example fault tree (figure 1) the resulting BDI) (figure 
2) was not rniniinu~n as it procluced ;I redundant cut set. To 
obtain only minimal cut sets the BDD must first undergo ;I 
minimising procedure. From the unrninirnised BDD the 
minimising algorithm of Rauzy (Ref. 6) creates ;I new BI>I) 
that symbolises only the minimal cut sets of the fault tree. If 
F=ite(x, G, H) then let 6 he ;I minimal solution of G which is 
not ai minitnal solution of H, then clearly the intersection of S 
and x will be ai minimnl solution of F. Lastly, the set 0 of all 
the miniinad solutions of F,  YO/,,^^^ ( F )  , will also include the 
miniinal solutions of H so: 
Ruzy  (Ref. 6) h s  defined a ‘without’ operator which removes 
from G,l,in :ill the paths included in ;i path of H. Applying this 
algorithm to the BDI) in figure 2 where ex11 node is 
considered in tum: 
FI=ite(Xl, F2, 0) - Here there are 110 solution\ 011 the 0 brainch 
so the paths o k  F2 remain unchmgecl. 
F2=ite(X2, F3, F4) - Here X3 is iIicluded in a path 011 both the 
1 branch (F3) xic l  the 0 branch (F4), therefore X3 is removecl 
trom the 1 brauich by replacing the tenninal 1 veriex with a 0. 
[Refer to figure X I  
F3=ite(X3, 0, FS) - FS does not contain any paths that :we 
included in the 1 hixich a s  this is a terminal vertex. 
F4=ite(X3, 1, 0) - The without operator does not :ipply a s  both 
0 and 1 brmiches w e  tcrinin;l. 
FS=ite(X4, 1,O) - Sane  applies ;is F4. 
The minimised BI)I> is drawn in figure X 
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F1 8 .  MOI~UULARISING 
Figure 8. h4iiiimiserl BDD. 
Tracing the paths through the minimised BDD we obtain the 
minimal cut sets: 
(1) Xl.X2.X4 
(2) x 1 .x3  
1. VARIABLE ORDERING SCHEME 
The ordering of basic events will cletermine the size of the 
resulting BDD. BI)IYs produced using ;t simplc "top-down" 
ordering of the v:u-i:tblcs are trequently inelficieiit since they 
produce it large iiurnber of non-minimal cut sets. An 
alternative ordering scheme is preseiited here which focuses 
on those basic events which are repeated in the 13tult tree 
structure. It is the repeattccl events which c;tusc the problem of 
non-minimal cut sets, and by considering these events first 
simplifies the resulting BDI) structure :tiid therefore inakes it 
more optimal. 
The alternative ordering scheme again considers the basic 
events in it top-down ordering (after the fault tree structure is 
contracted into a11 alteniating sequence o f  AND and ()R 
gates). However a s  each gale is considered the basic events 
which are inputs to the gatc are t;Lken in order of Uiosc which 
occur most frequently in the tault tree and placed in the 
ordering list. When gate input everits ;ue encountered which 
are already entered in the ordering list cluc to the occurrence at 
;I higher level in the tree then they iire iyiored ~ i d  the 
rernauiiing input events are ordered. 
Applying the new ordering heie to the examplc tault tree 
(figure 1) with repeated event X7, we get the orrlcring 
Xl<XkX2<X4.  The resulliiig BDI) toi tiits allernalive 
ordering is miniiiiuin so the minimising technique is not 
needed, this is aclvantageous in terms ot reduced comput;ition 
t h e .  Work cmied out to ditte inclicates tha( the new orrlering 
atppears to produce more optimal BDTI's comp;u-ecl to other 
orderings. Bryant (Ret. 13) recogiii\ed the prohlcin of 
computing iui ordering that iniiiutiises Uie size ot the Br)D md 
for some trees it may not be possiblc lo pioduce ;i miiiim;il 
BDD whatever the ordering. 
Further improvements in terms oi coinputational efficiency 
ciui he made for the more complex fiiult trees by modukrisiiig 
the fault tree hefore the milysis takes place. Kliocla et al. (Ref. 
14) define it module of ;I fiiult tree ~ L Y  Iiaving no inputs which 
appear elsewhere in the tree and iio outputs to the rest of the 
tree except from its output event. For example consider the 
fmlt  tree in figure 0. Modules wliicli have the properties 
defined above ru-e gates (i2, (3 iuicl Top. 
Q 
G1 x Q 
Firrure 9. A Fuult Tree which can be iiiodularised. 
0 
Figure 10. Modularised hul t  tree. 
The modularised fault tree is shown in figure 10. By then 
using the BDD method to mtlyse this tree in terins of the 
moduks and then each module in tuiii the results cxi he 
combined to provide iui efficient means ot ;uialysing the whole 
f ialt  tree. 
0. CONCLUSION 
('onventional top-down m c l  bottom-up techniques c;ui lead to 
many redundant cut sets ancl calculating exact top event 
probability can become impossible. To uiiprove these aitalysis 
procedures the aim has been to represent the system fiiilure 
logic in a mode which lends itsell to the mathernatical 
oiaiiipulnt ion. 
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Representing the Boolean failure logic eciu:itioii in  the form of 
a B1)I) provides an alternative techiiique which gives 
significant savings in the computational efficiency and lends 
itself to m;iiiipulation. Also the BDI) produces exact 
quantified results ancl top event parmeters such as failure 
probability and tlie system unconditional frulure intensity and 
the expected number of occuixnces c m  be obtained with e.:ise. 
To simplify the analysis even further the liiult tree may be 
modularised prior to tlie aiialysis. An alleimitive ordering of 
the basic event variables has also shown itself to signillcantly 
improve efficiency . 
The trade off for the advantages described is the effort taken to 
convert the logic from tlie fault tree structure to the BDL) 
form. However early work indicates that for large, complex 
trees this can produce ;I substantial recluction iii coniputational 
effort. 
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